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NOTES
FERC V. MAR TIN EXPLORA TION MANA GEMENT
CO.: PROPER PRICE TREATMENT FOR
DUAL-QUALIFIED NATURAL GAS
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) reshaped federal regulation
of natural gas wellhead prices.2 The NGPA maintained controls on natural
gas wellhead prices' but also introduced price deregulation into natural gas
markets.4 This dual system of continued regulation and deregulation of natural gas prices reflected the competing goals of Congress5 to provide sufficient price incentives for natural gas production6 while assuring adequate
supplies to consumers at reasonable prices.7
Congress delegated the administration of the wellhead pricing provisions
of the NGPA to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). s The
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) is one
of the five acts comprising the National Energy Act. The other acts are: (1) Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.); (2) Energy Tax
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 94 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); (3) National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); and (4) Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 45 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.).
2. See generally Public Service Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 322
(1983) (the NGPA "comprehensively and dramatically changed the method of pricing natural
gas").
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314-3315.
4. See id.§§ 3312, 3313, 3317, 3318.
5. See generally Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 379 (5th Cir. 1981) (the NGPA
"took into account the conflicting interests of producers and consumers"), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1142 (1982).
6. See generally Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. at 334 ("The new statutory rates are
intended to provide investors with adequate incentives to develop new sources of supply.").
7. See generally Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474 U.S.
409, 421 (1986) (the object of the NGPA was "to assure adequate supplies of natural gas at fair
prices").
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(6). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
succeeded to the authority of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in 1977 pursuant to title
IV of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7171-7177 (1982). This
Note will use FERC to refer to agency operations after the passage of the NGPA; the FPC will
denote agency operations prior to the enactment of the NGPA.
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implementation of the NGPA pricing policies burdened FERC with the task
of balancing the statute's contradictory objectives.9 On the one hand, FERC
must preserve price incentives for the continued exploration and development of natural gas reserves.' ° Alternatively, FERC must avoid exposing
consumers to inordinate increases in the price of natural gas. "
FERC's pricing authority is not absolute. 12 Title I'1

of the NGPA

prescribes the maximum lawful ceiling prices that sellers may charge for
sales of natural gas in a number of defined gas categories.' 4 Specifically, title
I identifies eight different categories of natural gas production and sets forth
the qualification criteria for each category.' 5 Concurrently, section 12116 of
title I provides a statutory timetable for the gradual elimination of price ceil17
ings for several of the eight categories of natural gas.
The statutory framework of regulated and deregulated price categories,
however, is not mutually exclusive. Natural gas may qualify simultaneously
under more than one statutory price category. Natural gas qualifying under
multiple price-regulated categories or under both a price-deregulated cate9. See Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title 1,59 TEX. L. REV.

101, 121 (1980).
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312, 3313, 3317, 3318.
11. See id.§§ 3314-3316, 3319.
12. The NGPA also "eliminate[d] a large portion of FERC's price setting discretion with

the statutory provisions setting more value-based gas prices." Morgan & Patterson, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: Four Years of Practiceand Two Years to Make Perfect, 71 Ky. L.J.
105, 116 (1982). FERC, however, retained the authority to increase ceiling prices for several
categories of natural gas. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314(b)(2), 3316(c), 3319(b)(2).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3319.
14. Id. Title I establishes eight different categories of natural gas production, prescribes
the maximum lawful price to charge for first sales in each category, and sets forth a methodology for increasing first sales prices. The categories are based on a number of factors, including
the date the well was drilled, whether the gas had been sold under intrastate contract, whether
the gas had been committed or dedicated to interstate commerce, and the need for price incentives for the production of new and hard-to-produce gas. Generally, the categories distinguish
between "old" gas (pre-NGPA gas) and "new" gas (post-NGPA gas). For a more detailed
analysis of the pricing provisions of title I, see generally Leufven, The Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978: What It Means to the Independent Producer, 20 S. TEX. L.J. 19 (1979); MacAvoy,
The NaturalGas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 811 (1979); Ringleb, Natural Gas
ProducerPriceRegulation Under the NGP: Regulatory Failure,Alternatives, and Reform, 20
Hous. L. REV. 709 (1983).
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 3331.
17. See id. Section 121 mandated a three-phase deregulation scheme. Id. Pursuant to
§ 121(a), natural gas qualifying as new natural gas under § 102, as gas produced from new
onshore production wells under § 103, and as intrastate gas under § 105 and § 106 was deregulated on January 1, 1985. Id. § 3331(a). Pursuant to § 121(b), natural gas qualifying as highcost gas under § 107(c) was deregulated on November 1, 1979. Id. § 3331(b). Pursuant to
§ 121(c), additional volumes of natural gas qualifying under § 103 were decontrolled on July 1,
1987. Id. § 3331(c).
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gory and a price-controlled category is called "dual-qualified gas." 18 To illustrate the dual-qualified issue, natural gas sold from a well drilled on or
after February 19, 1977 may be priced under section 10219 of the NGPA, a
category deregulated by section 121.2 o That same gas, however, also may
qualify for higher ceiling prices under sections 10721 and 10822 of the
NGPA. Natural gas contracts generally respond to the dual-qualification
phenomenon by providing two clauses: one that sets the price if the natural
gas is regulated and, conversely, one that operates if the natural gas is
deregulated.2 3
Section 101(b)(5) 24 of the NGPA represents the statutory statement on
the dual-qualified gas question. This section provides that the category resulting in the highest price shall apply.2 5 Section 101(b)(5), however, fails to
specify whether the deregulated or regulated price constitutes the highest
price applicable.2 6
Resolution of the question of which price category, regulated or deregulated, fulfilled the highest price applicable language of the dual-qualification
provision of the NGPA fell to FERC. The operation of market pricing
mechanisms for natural gas complicated the dual-qualification issue. Contrary to Congress' predictions, deregulation did not result in a progressive
increase in natural gas prices.27 Instead, regulated prices for natural gas
surpassed prices for natural gas on the open market. 28 The impact of lower
market clearing prices on the dual-qualified issue was clear. Faced with the
steady unanticipated decline in market clearing prices for natural gas supplies, producers preferred to qualify gas under the higher, regulated price
categories. 29 Alternatively, pipeline purchasers and consumers, eager to
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(5).
19. Id. § 3312; see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 3317.
22. Id. § 3318.
23. See Final Rule on Deregulation and Other Pricing Changes on January 1, 1985,
Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,874, 46,878 (1984) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pts. 270-274) [hereinafter Order No. 406].
24. 15 U.S.C. § 331 1(b)(5). Section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA provides, in its entirety, that:
If any natural gas qualifies under more than one provision of this subchapter providing for any maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a price with
respect to any first sale of such natural gas, the provision which could result in the
highest price shall be applicable.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. See Order No. 406, supra note 23, at 46,678.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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30
benefit from market conditions, favored the lower market-clearing prices.
The advent of the principal deregulation date of January 1, 1985,31 forced
FERC to address the dual-qualification issue. Deregulation represented the
emergence of conflicts over the proper price treatment for dual-qualified gas.
In Order No. 406,32 FERC resolved the question by decontrolling natural
gas qualifying under both a regulated price category and a deregulated price
category and thus, freed this gas from the price ceiling provisions of the
NGPA. 33 FERC reasoned that the deregulation of dual-qualified gas complied with the purpose of the NGPA to substitute market forces for price
controls. 34 The FERC decision effectively lowered the price of dual-qualified gas.
Pipelines and consumers heralded FERC's action to deregulate dual-qualified gas. 35 The response of producers, however, differed markedly. Deprived of higher regulated prices for dual-category gas, natural gas
producers sought review of FERC's decision in Order No. 406 by filing suit
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.3 6 Producer
petitioners charged that FERC wrongfully deregulated dual-qualified natural gas. 3 7 Producers argued that the dual-qualification provision of the
NGPA presents a producer with an election between a regulated or deregulated price."
In Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FER C,3 9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted the producers' position.'
The Tenth Circuit held that FERC's decision to deregulate and thus lower
the price of dual-category gas was contrary to the clear intent of Congress as
set forth in the plain language of the NGPA.4 1 The Tenth Circuit inter-

30. Id.
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (1982).
32. Order No. 406, supra note 23.
33. Id. at 46,878.
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 134-135 and accompanying text., Arguably, the potential for lower
purchase prices for natural gas encouraged pipeline support of Order No. 406. Pipelines reported paying lower prices for dual-qualified natural gas as a result of Order No. 406. See, e.g.,
Brief of Williams Natural Gas Co. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing at 4, Martin
Exploration Management Co. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir.) (No. 84-2756) ("Under
Order No. 406, WNG obtained substantially lower prices for this dually qualified gas."), rev'd,
108 S.Ct. 1765 (1988).
36. Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988).
37. Id. at 1065.
38. Id. at 1069.
39. Id. at 1059.
40. Id. at 1065.
41. Id.
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preted the NGPA to permit a producer to elect between a regulated and
deregulated price for his dual-qualified gas.4 2
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 43 In FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co.," the Court held that the plain language of the
NGPA called for the deregulation of dual-qualified natural gas.4 5 The Court
characterized the decision of the court of appeals to allow producers an election between a deregulated and regulated price for dual-qualified natural gas
as "contrary to the whole thrust of the [NGPA]."" The Supreme Court
also observed that by limiting reference exclusively to the deregulated price,
its decision would alleviate the potential for price chaos or disuniformity
that would result from a dual-price system.4 7
This Note will trace the history of federal regulation of natural gas prices.
The Note will examine the present statutory formula for natural gas pricing
set forth in the NGPA. A review of the dual-qualification provision of the
NGPA will demonstrate that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history adequately prescribes the proper price treatment for dual-qualified natural gas. Given the ambiguity in the statutory language and the
legislative history, this Note will observe that both FERC and the Tenth
Circuit proferred reasonable, albeit variant, interpretations of the dual-qualification issue. An analysis of FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co.
will suggest that judicial reluctance to depart from legislative objectives,
rather than the plain language of the NGPA, motivated the decision to
deregulate dually qualified natural gas. The Note will conclude with a discussion of the impact of Martin Exploration on present and future natural
gas markets.
I.

EARLY NATURAL GAS PRICE REGULATION

A.

The Natural Gas Act of 1938

The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA)4 8 represented the first comprehensive federal regulation of the natural gas industry. The need for a national
plan for natural gas legislation stemmed from judicial denial of state power
to control the activities of interstate pipelines.49 State attempts to control
42. Id. at 1069.

43. FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765, 1767 (1988).
44. Id. at 1765.
45. Id at 1768.
46. Id. at 1769.
47. See id. at 1770.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982). For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the NGA, see Note, Legislative Historyof the NaturalGas Act, 44 GEo. L.J. 695 (1956).
49. For United States Supreme Court opinions holding state regulation of wholesale
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interstate pipelines represented unconstitutional restrictions on interstate

commerce. 5 ° The states' inability to regulate the conduct of interstate pipelines, coupled with the pipelines' increasingly monopolistic control over natural gas availability, service, and prices, prompted Congress to enact federal
natural gas legislation.5"
Congress entrusted the administration of the NGA to the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) 52 and authorized the FPC to establish "just and reasonable" 5 3 prices for the transportation and sale for resale of natural gas in
interstate commerce. 54 The NGA empowered the FPC to eliminate pipeline

monopoly practices through the creation of a national regulatory scheme for
the interstate transportation and interstate sale for resale of natural gas.55
The NGA directed the FPC to regulate the interstate pipeline industry in

order to assure reasonably priced natural gas to consumers without jeopard56
izing the reliability or adequacy of supply.
prices to be a burden on interstate commerce, see State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290
U.S. 561, 563-64 (1934); Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 8690 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 306-10 (1924).
50. See supra note 49.
51. The Federal Trade Commission, in a series of reports, identified several abuses by
natural gas pipelines, including monopoly control over consumer prices, and recommended
federal regulation of interstate gas prices. See Note, supra note 9, at 106. The Federal Trade
Commission reports are mentioned explicitly in § l(a) of the NGA. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)
(1982). The reports documented numerous problems existing in the natural gas industry
including:
[W]aste in production, growing out of excess production capacity in the Southwest
(and the lack of field unitization); "unregulated monopoly control" in the Appalachian area; discrimination by pipelines in both the buying and selling of gas; "costly
struggles" between competing pipelines; "excessive profits in many natural gas sales
between affiliated companies" effected to frustrate state regulation ....
N. CLARK & G. CLARK, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS AND GAS: PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS - AND THE COMMODITY MARKET ALTERNATIVES 10 (1984).
52. In 1920, Congress, in the Federal Power Act, created the FPC, the predecessor agency
to FERC. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1982).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1982).
54. Id. Intrastate gas, which is gas produced and consumed within a single state, was not
subject to FPC jurisdiction.
55. See id. § 717. In FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he primary aim of this legislation [the NGA] was to protect consumers
against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies." Id. at 610. Similarly, in Atlantic
Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), the Supreme Court
declared that Congress intended the NGA "to afford consumers a complete, permanent and
effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." Id. at 388; see also Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 335-36 (1951); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1947).
56. Several federal circuit court opinions hold that the objective of the NGA was to assure
adequate, reliable, and reasonably priced supplies of natural gas. See Public Service Comm'n
v. FERC, 610 F.2d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1979); Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 598 F.2d
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin: Extending the FPC's Regulatory
Authority to Producer Wellhead Sales

The FPC interpreted the NGA to authorize only the regulation of interstate pipeline transportation and sale for resale of natural gas.57 The FPC,
however, did not interpret its NGA powers to encompass the regulation of
wellhead prices for sales to interstate pipelines by independent producers.58
The FPC's definition of its jurisdictional reach was not ill-founded; the
NGA expressly exempted the production or gathering of natural gas. 59
The FPC's narrow view of its NGA powers, although consistent with the
original intent of the statute," ° did not survive Supreme Court scrutiny in
PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin.6 The Court in Phillips overturned the
FPC's determination that Phillips Petroleum Company, an independent natural gas producer, was not subject to FPC regulation because the company
did not transport natural gas in interstate commerce.6 2 The Court, relying
upon the statutory language and the legislative history, 63 rejected the argument that Congress intended to regulate only interstate pipelines under the
NGA. 64 Instead, the Court interpreted the NGA to require FPC "jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce,
370, 379 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., 570 F.2d
1138, 1146 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978).
57. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. Section l(b) of the NGA defined the statute's scope:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for
ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use,
and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not
apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of
natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or
gathering of natural gas.
15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
The NGA also granted the FPC broad control over additional interstate pipeline activities.
Section 7 of the NGA requires FPC approval prior to pipeline entry, expansion, and abandonment of facilities or services. Id. § 717f (1982).
58. Federal Power Commission opinions interpret § 1(b) to extend the FPC's jurisdiction
to gas sales at the downstream end of interstate pipelines, but not to sales by producers to
interstate pipelines. See In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246, 276 (1951); see also Morgan & Patterson, supra note 12, at 108.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b).
60. The NGA's legislative history indicates a congressional intent to exempt producer
sales to pipelines. See Note, supra note 48, at 716-21. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747 (1968), the Supreme Court ultimately acknowledged that the NGA does "not specifically extend to producers or to wellhead sales of natural gas." Id. at 755.
61. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
62. Id. at 677.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 681-84.
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whether by a pipeline company or not and whether occurring before, during,
or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company." 65 The Phillips decision extended the FPC's duty under the NGA to the regulation of producer wellhead sales in addition to the regulation of interstate pipeline
sales.6 6
Neither the NGA nor the Phillips decision, however, provided the FPC
with a pricing formula for producer wellhead sales.67 Without guidance on
the procedures to use to establish producer wellhead prices, the FPC referred to the cost-of-service methodology that it employed to set prices for
interstate pipeline sales. 68 Under this approach, the FPC identified historic
costs of production for individual producers and allowed prices sufficient to
69
permit each producer to recover his particular costs.
The cost-of-service methodology quickly proved unworkable. 70 The FPC
experienced little difficulty with the company-by-company application of the
cost-of-service formula to the small number of interstate pipelines. By contrast, the vast number of natural gas producers made FPC administration of
an individual approach to producer rate determination an unmanageable, if
not impossible, task.71
In 1960, the FPC substituted the cost-of-service approach to individual
producer ratemaking with the area rate methodology. 72 Under this proce73
dure, the FPC established a single rate for specific producing regions. Similar to the cost-of-service formula, the FPC based its calculation of area rates
on historic average costs of production, rather than on projected future
65. Id. at 682.
66. Id. at 685.
67. See Morgan & Patterson, supra note 12, at 109.

68. Id.
69. See Breyer & MacAvoy, The NaturalGas Shortage and the Regulation ofNatural Gas

Producers,86 HARV. L. REv. 941, 953 (1973). By using average historic costs, the FPC assumed that the future costs of finding and producing natural gas would not differ markedly
from those in the 1950's. See Pierce, Reconstituting the NaturalGasIndustryfrom Wellhead to
Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8-9 (1988).
70. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1959).
71. See Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 69, at 953-54; Morgan & Patterson, supra note 12,
at 109-10.
72. See Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960). The FPC formally adopted the
area rate methodology in 1965. See Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965) (Opinion No.
468); Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 1068 (1965) (Opinion No. 468-A); see also Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (upholding the FPC's use of the area rate
methodology).

73. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 790-813. The area rate approach
initially covered only natural gas production by producers. However, the FPC eventually con-

cluded that natural gas production'by interstate pipeline also should be eligible for area rate
treatment. See Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding (Phase I), 42 F.P.C. 738, 752 (1969)
(Opinion No. 568).
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costs. 74 The historic cost approach, however, failed to provide producers
with adequate price incentives because current marginal production costs

always exceeded historic average costs.7 5 To encourage production activity,
the FPC also developed a two-tier rate structure for each producing region:
a higher "new gas" rate for natural gas produced from wells drilled after a
specified date and a lower "old gas" rate for all remaining natural gas.76
Despite the FPC's regulatory manipulations, the historical-cost, twotiered rate regulation of natural gas prices in the interstate market resulted
in less production of interstate gas supplies.77 By contrast, the unregulated
intrastate market, with its open, competitive conditions, experienced all the
new supply activities.78 In a belated attempt to respond to the bifurcation of
the natural gas market, the FPC shifted from area ratemaking to national
ratemaking in the early 1970's. 79 The national rate methodology covered
natural gas produced from wells drilled after January 1, 1973, and applied to
both natural gas producers and interstate pipelines."0 The FPC also promulgated regulations to replace its historic cost approach with an incentive cost
approach for natural gas production in interstate markets. 81
The FPC's policies, however, failed to eliminate the distinction between a
regulated interstate market and an unregulated intrastate market.82 Ulti-

mately, the FPC's implementation of the NGA and its judicial progeny led
74. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 813-22.
75. See Allison, Natural Gas Pricing: The Eternal Debate, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 13
(1985).
76. See id. at 13-14.
77. See Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, 46 F.P.C. 86, 110-11 (1971) (Opinion
No. 598); Note, Deregulation and Natural Gas Purchase Contracts: Examination Through
Neoclassicaland Relational Contract Theories, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 45 (1985).
78. See Note, supra note 77, at 45.
79. See Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212,
2215 (1974) (Opinion No. 699).
80. See id. National ratemaking yielded closer approximations to the costs of finding and
producing natural gas than the FPC's earlier attempts. See Pierce, supra note 69, at 10.
81. The FPC initiated programs establishing production incentive rates to stimulate dedications of natural gas to interstate markets. See Allison, supra note 75, at 4 n.4. For a concise
and excellent review of these FPC programs, see Nordhaus, ProducerRegulation and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 829, 837-40 (1979).
82. The FPC regulation of producer wellhead prices contributed significantly to the natural gas shortages of the 1970's. See Allison, supra note 75, at 9; Breyer & MacAvoy, supra
note 69, at 965; see also E. ERICKSON, NATURAL GAS AND THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT:
A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS 9 (1981) (characterizing the FPC's attempts to ease natural gas
shortages in interstate markets by revising upwards interstate ceiling prices as "too tentative
and timid"). For discussions of the FPC's various approaches to regulation of producer wellhead sales, see Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 69, at 952-65; Manning, FederalRegulation of
Pricing Provisionsin Natural Gas Sales Contracts - From the Phillips Decision to the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 Hous. L. REV. 1081, 1086-90 (1979); Morgan & Patterson, supra
note 12, at 109-12.
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to an unavoidable dilemma: interstate supplies could not meet the increasing demand for natural gas in interstate markets, and intrastate wellhead
83
prices continued to advance beyond interstate prices.
II.

CURRENT NATURAL GAS PRICE REGULATION

A.

The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978

Congressional recognition that the FPC's administration of NGA regulations, if unaltered, would continue to prohibit the interstate supply of natural gas from meeting consumer demand, 4 led to the passage of the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978.85 In the NGPA, Congress set forth three distinct,
but interdependent theories toward natural gas regulation. 6 First, to elimi83. See E. ERICKSON, supra note 82, at 9. The disparity between intrastate and interstate
natural gas prices was significant:
Between 1969 and 1976, interstate prices for new natural gas rose by more than 600
percent, from 19.8 cents per Mcf [million cubic feet] to $1.42 per Mcf. However,
during the same period, intrastate prices rose at an even greater rate, from 18 cents
per Mcf in 1969 to as high as $2.39 per Mcf in 1977, better than a 1,200 percent
increase.
S. REP. No. 436, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
84. Several factors contributed to the serious shortages of natural gas supplies in the early
1970's: increased demand for natural gas in response to federal air quality standards, increased demand for natural gas in the manufacture of petrochemicals and fertilizers, higher oil
prices, and decreased production of natural gas as a result of producer rate regulation. See
Note, supra note 77, at 44 n. 12.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). Both the House and Senate recognized the crisis in
the natural gas industry, but developed two dramatically different responses to the problems in
natural gas markets. The House bill would have extended regulation by imposing uniform
price controls on all natural gas, whether interstate or intrastate. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). Alternatively, the Senate bill would have deregulated all natural gas prices by
1982, with price controls in the interim period. S. 2104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). A conference committee resolved the conflict between the houses on the appropriate solution to the
problems plaguing the natural gas industry. The conference bill represented a reconciliation
between the House's increased regulation and the Senate's accelerated deregulation. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 67-69, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 8983, 8984-85.

Statements by individual legislators illustrate congressional recognition that the conference
bill represented a compromise between the two conflicting objectives of continuing price controls and immediately deregulating gas prices. Representative Dingell, the floor manager of
the Conference Report in the House, remarked that "[b]y steering clear of the extremes
presented by these policy alternatives, the Natural Gas Policy Act successfully avoids the deleterious consequences of either policy alternative." 124 CONG. REC. 38,361 (1978). Representative Dingell, fearing that immediate deregulation would impact consumers adversely and
secure windfall profits for producers, observed that "[p]hased deregulation as set forth in the
conference report avoids both of these objectionable results." Id.
86. See Allison, supra note 75, at 6-7. The three philosophies reflect the debate that surrounded the passage of the NGPA. Id. According to the author, proponents of change to
federal natural gas regulation generally espoused three theories: the "blackmail theory," the
"depletion theory," and the "free market theory." Id. The blackmail theorists alleged that the
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nate the bifurcation of natural gas markets, any producer wellhead pricing
scheme must apply to both interstate and intrastate markets.8 7 Second, to
provide incentives for the production of natural gas, a free market must replace the price-controlled system.88 Finally, to relieve gas shortages in one
market by transferring a gas surplus from another market, impediments to
the flow of natural gas between the interstate and intrastate markets must be
removed.8 9

B.

Natural Gas Pricing Under Title I of the NGPA

In title I of the NGPA, Congress created a dual system of regulation and
deregulation of natural gas prices.9" First, title I applied a new price control
structure to all natural gas, regardless of its status as a product of interstate
or intrastate commerce.9 1 The objective of the price control provisions was
nation had abundant "supplies of low-cost natural gas which producers were withholding from
the interstate markets in order to coerce Congress into decontrolling natural gas prices." Id. at
6 (footnote omitted). In contrast, the advocates of the depletion theory predicted that the
nation "would soon run out of natural gas, regardless of the pricing strategy adopted." Id. at 7
(footnote omitted).
Proponents of both theories sponsored the same natural gas policy approach,
which was to extend federal natural gas regulation into the intrastate market. The
"blackmail" theorists felt this solution would convince withholding producers that
they had nothing to gain by withholding gas supplies. New gas supplies would come
forth which the interstate market could acquire without engaging in bidding contests
with companies in the intrastate market.
For "depletion" theorists, the goal was to extend federal allocation programs to
the intrastate markets so that the nation's dwindling gas supplies would be shared on
the basis of need rather than on a willingness to pay. Not only would this approach
give the interstate market a greater share of the nation's gas supplies, it also would
prevent petroleum companies from receiving large scarcity rents.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Alternatively, free market proponents attributed natural gas shortages
to regulatory shortcomings, not to fraud or depletion by the producing industry. Id. Free
market theorists advocated the deregulation of natural gas prices in order to "provide producers with adequate production incentives and induce consumers to use energy more efficiently." Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
87. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3315(b)(3)(A), 3316(b) (1982) (regulating sales of gas under existing
intrastate contracts); id. § 3315(b)(3)(D) (providing for uniform treatment of new natural gas
whether interstate or intrastate). The NGPA establishes ceiling prices on first sales of natural
gas regardless of whether the sale occurs in intrastate or interstate commerce. See id.
§§ 3315(b)(3), 3316(b).
88. See id. §§ 3312, 3313, 3317, 3318. Interestingly, the natural gas ceiling price provisions of the NGPA integrate the production incentive objectives of the FPC's pricing policies.
See e.g., Allison, supra note 75, at 4-5.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. For a brief summary of the NGPA provisions facilitating freer gas flows between the interstate and intrastate market, see Allison, supra
note 75, at 38.
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3319 (1982); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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two-fold: to eliminate the price disparity between interstate and intrastate
gas 9 2 and to protect consumers from increases in natural gas prices. 93 Second, title I introduced an element of deregulation into an industry whose
buying and selling practices represented a tradition of strict wellhead price
ceilings.94 The phased deregulation scheme provided incentives to producers to explore for and develop new gas supplies, thereby alleviating natural
gas shortages." Title I reconciled the competing objectives of maintaining
adequate supplies at reasonable prices to consumers by gradually deregulating new and hard-to-produce gas while retaining price controls on old, lowcost gas.

96

The production incentive response to natural gas shortages is provided in
sections 102, 9' 103,98 107, 99 and 108' ° ° of the NGPA. Section 102 sets the
price ceiling for new natural gas and gas produced from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).' 0 ' Section 103 establishes the ceiling price for new, onshore
production wells.' °2 Section 107 provides incentive pricing for high-cost
92. Congress created a single national market for natural gas to eliminate "the interstateintrastate distinction.., together with the resulting distorting effect on both production and
distribution." S. REP. No. 436, supra note 83, at 21.
93. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314-3315 (1982). The lowest ceiling prices are imposed on "old"
gas. Id. Continuation of price controls on lower cost gas serves two objectives. It permits
interstate pipelines to keep the average cost of gas low despite the addition of expensive new or
deregulated gas purchases, and provides residential and commercial consumers with an interim buffer against market-clearing prices. See Morgan & Patterson, supra note 12, at 122.
94. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
95. To stimulate production, "new" gas receives a higher ceiling price escalated at an
incentive rate. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3313 (1982). Hard-to-produce gas receives the highest
ceiling prices. See id. §§ 3317-3318. For a concise analysis of the production incentive effects
of the NGPA, see Lovett, Incentive and ConservationEffects.- Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
16 Hous. L. REV. 1129 (1979).
96. See Oklahoma v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 645 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (describing the
NGPA as "Congress' solution to the necessity of encouraging production and exploration of
new natural gas sources and maintaining adequate supplies of natural gas in the interstate
market"), aff'd, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982) (footnote
omitted).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 3312.
98. Id. § 3313.
99. Id. § 3317.
100. Id. § 3318.
101. Id. § 3312. To qualify for the § 102 price, natural gas must be produced from a new
Outer Continental Shelf lease (entered into on or after April 20, 1977), a new onshore reservoir
(discovered on or after July 27, 1976), or a new onshore well located 2.5 miles or more from
the nearest marker well or located at a depth of at least 1,000 feet below that marker well. Id.
§ 3312(c)(1). The § 102 category represents new production and therefore receives favorable
price treatment as a production incentive.
102. Id. § 3313. To qualify for the § 103 price, natural gas must be produced from a new,
onshore production well for which the surface drilling commenced on or after February 19,
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natural gas.103 Similarly, section 108 sets special pricing for stripper
wells.' ° 4
Balanced against the production incentive policy is the consumer price
protection policy embodied in sections 10 4 ,'°' 105,106 106,107 and 109108 of
the NGPA. Section 104 sets the ceiling price for natural gas supplies committed or dedicated to interstate commerce prior to the enactment of the
NGPA. " Section 105 prescribes the price for gas sales under existing intrastate contracts. 1 1° Section 106 establishes the price ceiling for gas sales
under rollover contracts.'
Section 109 is a catchall, including all natural
gas not covered by any maximum lawful pricing scheme under any other
section." 2
1977, must meet federal or state well spacing requirements, and must not have been within a
proration unit existing at the date of initial drilling. Id. § 3313(c).
103. IM. § 3317. To qualify for the § 107 "high cost gas" price, natural gas must be produced from a well on which the surface drilling commenced on or after February 19, 1977, and
is produced from a completion location at a depth in excess of 15,000 feet; produced from

geopressure brine; occluded gas produced from coal seams; produced from Devonian shale; or
produced under conditions presenting extraordinary risks or costs as determined by FERC.

Id. § 3317(c).
104. Id.§ 3318. To qualify for the § 108 "stripper well gas" price, natural gas must be
produced from a well that, at its maximum efficient rate of flow, did not exceed an average of
60 million cubic feet per production day. Id. § 3318(b)(1). Natural gas may retain its stripper
well status if the production exceeds an average of 60 million cubic feet per production day
during any 90-day period as a result of recognized enhanced recovery techniques. Id.
§ 3318(b)(2).
105. Id. § 3314.
106. Id.§ 3315.
107. Id.§ 3316.
108. Id.§ 3319.
109. Id. § 3314. Section 104 applies to natural gas committed or dedicated to interstate
commerce on November 8, 1978, the date of the enactment of the NGPA, and subject to a just
and reasonable rate under the NGA. Id. § 3314(a). Section 104 prices are lower than the
prices provided in the other pricing sections of the NGPA. The NGPA, however, authorizes
FERC to set higher ceiling prices provided that the higher price is just and reasonable. Id.
§ 3314(b)(2).
110. Id. § 3315. To qualify for the § 105 price, natural gas must be sold under an existing
contract or successor to that contract, and must not have been "committed or dedicated to
interstate commerce on November 8, 1978." Id. § 3315(a).
111. Id. § 3316. To qualify for the § 106 price, natural gas must be subject to either an
interstate or intrastate rollover contract. Id. § 3316(a)-(b). The term "rollover contract" refers to contracts entered into on or after the date of the enactment of the NGPA, "for the first
sale of natural gas that was previously subject to an existing contract which expired at the end
of a fixed term.., specified by the provisions of such existing contract, as such contract was in
effect on the date of the enactment of [the NGPA]." Id. § 3301(12).
112. Id. § 3319. To qualify for the § 109 price, natural gas must be produced from a new
well that does not qualify for a higher ceiling price; committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on the date of the enactment of the NGPA and not subject to a just and reasonable
NGA rate; neither subject to an existing contract nor committed or dedicated to interstate
commerce on November 8, 1978; or produced from the Prudhoe Bay Unit on the North Slope
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The eight categories of ceiling prices limit the amount that a producer can
charge for his natural gas." 3 The price ceilings, however, are not absolute.
Section 121 of the NGPA introduced a phased scheme for the removal of the
price ceilings for some of the eight categories." 4 The phased deregulation
scheme of section 121 reflected the expectation of the statute's drafters that
market prices for natural gas always would exceed statutory ceiling
prices."'S To forestall the impact of higher deregulated prices, Congress expressly mandated in section 121 that designated statutory categories of natural gas, including sections 102 and 103 gas, would be deregulated on January
1, 1985, and July 1, 1987.116
III.

THE QUESTION OF DUAL-QUALIFIED NATURAL GAS
UNDER THE

A.

NGPA

The Statutory Framework

The eight price categories of natural gas specified in title I of the NGPA
are not mutually exclusive. Under the NGPA, substantial quantities of natural gas may be "dual-qualified." Dual-qualification allows natural gas to
qualify simultaneously under more than one statutory pricing provision.
The overlap can occur between multiple price-regulated categories as well as
between categories free from maximum lawful ceiling prices and categories
subject to ceiling prices. To illustrate the overlap between regulated and
deregulated categories, natural gas sold from a well drilled on or after February 19, 1977 may be priced under section 102, a category deregulated by
section 121.1"7 The same gas, however, may qualify simultaneously for
higher ceiling prices under section 107(c) or 108 categories denoting hard-toproduce natural gas." 8 Section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA is the statutory provision that determines which of the price categories should apply. Under
section 101(b)(5), "the provision which could result in the highest price shall
of Alaska and transported through the system pursuant to the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976. Id. § 3319(a).

113. See id. § 331 l(b)(9). The eight categories of ceiling prices, however, are not the sole
determinant of price. Another determinant of price retained under the NGPA is the price
specified in the contract. The NGPA allows the contract price agreed to by the parties to bind
the parties provided that the contract price is below the applicable statutory ceiling price. Id.
The statutory ceiling prices do not otherwise "supersede or nullify the effectiveness of the price
established under such contract." Id.
114. See id. § 3331; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115. See 124 CONG. REC. 38,361 (1978) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("In the future ...
prices would almost certainly continue to rise."); see also 124 CONG. REC. 31,819 (1978) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a) and (c) (1982).
117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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be applicable."' 19
Congress provided minimal legislative guidance on the precise operation
of the dual-qualification provision. The conference report120 reiterates the
statutory directive to award the highest price treatment to dual-qualified gas.
The conference report provides that if natural gas is dual-qualified, "the provisions that permit the seller to obtain the highest price applies."' 12 1 The
explanatory statement, 122 prepared subsequent to the filing of the conference
report in the Senate, also offered guidance on the precise operation of section
101(b)(5). The explanatory statement advised that section 101(b)(5) "is intended to facilitate resolution of which ceiling price may apply if more than
' 2
one ceiling price rule appears applicable."' 1
Congressional floor statements do not introduce additional insight into the
operation of the dual-qualification provision. Indeed, the foremost congressional leaders on natural gas policy provided perfunctory assessments of the
operation of the dual-qualification provision of the NGPA. Representative
Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, reasoned that "[i]t is up to the producer to apply for whatever [price] designation he determines is most likely to be of greatest benefit to him."1 24 Senator
Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee,
explained that section 101(b)(5) allows a producer to "claim or apply for the
' 25
highest price to which he is entitled."'
Congressional debate over statutory provisions reveals contradictory viewpoints on the proper price treatment for dual-qualified natural gas. The
statements of Senator Bartlett illustrate congressional uncertainty over the
appropriate price status for section 108 stripper well natural gas. Senator
Bartlett suggested that stripper well natural gas is deregulated, but "only to
the extent that such wells are otherwise new [section 102] wells and would
be deregulated anyway."'' 26 With this remark, Senator Bartlett extended
deregulated price treatment to section 108 gas that also qualified under section 102. However, Senator Bartlett's commitment to the deregulation of
119. 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(5); see also supra note 24.
120. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1752, supra note 85, reprinted in 1978 U.S.

CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEWS 8983.

121. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1752, supra note 85, at 74, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 8991.
122. See 124 CONG. REc. 38,362-67 (1978). Representative Dingell, the floor manager of
the conference report in the House, and Representatives Staggers, Ashley, Eckhardt, and Wilson prepared an explanatory statement to respond to "questions ... regarding the meaning of
certain sections."

123.
124.
125.
126.

124 CONG. REC. 38,362 (1978).

124 CONG. REC. 38,363 (1978).
Id. (statement of Rep. Dingell).
124 CONG. REC. 29,109 (1978) (statement of Sen. Jackson).
124 CONG. REC. 31,387 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bartlett).
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stripper well gas is confusing. He also asserted that the NGPA will maintain
price controls "forever" on several categories of natural gas, including stripper well natural gas.127
B. Administrative Deregulation of Dual-QualifiedGas
With the advent of the deregulation date of January 1, 1985,128 FERC
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking1 29 to commence its consideration of
the proper legal treatment of gas that qualifies for both a regulated and
deregulated price. FERC proposed deregulating all dual-qualified gas, regardless of whether the gas also qualified for a regulated price under the
NGPA. 3 ° FERC asserted that this result was consistent with the statutory
goal of the NGPA to substitute market forces for price regulation."' Significantly, FERC also observed that the dual-qualification provision of the
NGPA "arguably" provided a producer with an option to remain price-regulated if the regulated ceiling price for his natural gas exceeded the deregu13 2
lated market price.
Natural gas producers, pipelines, consumer groups, and other interested
parties submitted comments on the proposed rule. l3 3 The pipeline industry
wholeheartedly supported FERC's decision to deregulate dual-qualified
gas. 134 Pipelines generally argued that by allowing producers an election
between regulated and deregulated prices, FERC would defeat the congressional movement toward substituting government control with market
127.

124 CONG. REC. 29,379 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bartlett).
128. See supra note 17.
129. Proposed Rule on Deregulation and Other Pricing Changes on January 1, 1985,
Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,399 (1984) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
270-274) (proposed Sept. 13, 1984). The proposed rulemaking addressed several issues relating
to the implementation of the January 1, 1985 deregulation date. However, this Note focuses
only on the proper legal treatment of natural gas qualifying for both a regulated and deregulated price.
130. Id. at 36,401.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. FERC received approximately 100 comments on the proposed rule. Order No. 406,
supra note 23, at 46,875. Producers comprised 45% of the comments, pipelines comprised
25%, and utilities, local distribution companies, and consumers comprised 30%. Id. FERC
did not hold a hearing on the rulemaking; instead, FERC convened an informal public conference on October 11, 1984.
134. See generally Comments of United Gas Pipe Line Company and United Texas Transmission Company in Docket No. RM84-14-000, Deregulation and Other Pricing Changes on
January 1, 1985, Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, at 3 [hereinafter United Companies Comments] ("United and United Texas agree that gas which qualifies for a deregulated category
and for a regulated category is price deregulated.").
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forces.1 3 Alternatively, producers argued for a choice, recommending that
FERC interpret section 101(b)(5) to allow a seller the option to select between a deregulated or regulated price. 136 Producers asserted that if FERC
failed to modify its proposal to deregulate dual-qualified gas, production of
hard-to-produce natural gas would become uneconomical.' 3 7
After reviewing the comments, FERC issued Order No. 406. 13' The order deregulated natural gas qualifying for both a regulated price and a
deregulated price. 139 FERC's decision effectively required the sale of dualqualified gas at market clearing prices, regardless of whether the gas qualified for a higher statutory ceiling price.'"
FERC substantiated the deregulation of dual-qualified gas on its reading
of section 121 of the NGPA. FERC interpreted section 121 to represent a
135. Id. at 5. The pipelines agreed with FERC that producers do not have a right to
choose between a regulated or unregulated price. Id. at 3.
136. See generally Comments of Damson Oil Corporation in Docket No. RM84-14-000,
Deregulation and Other Pricing Changes on January 1, 1985, Under the Natural Gas Policy
Act, at 6 [hereinafter Damson Oil Comments] ("Damson urges the Commission not to require
producers to take the deregulated price, but continue the option.., to charge or collect either
the incentive or the deregulated price.") (emphasis in original). Producers, particularly independent producers who primarily produced incentive-priced gas under §§ 107(c)(5) (tight
sands formation gas) and 108 (stripper well gas), recommended that FERC correct its initial
interpretation of § 101(b)(5) in order to permit a producer a choice between a regulated and a
deregulated price for dual-qualified gas. See id. The Independent Oil and Gas Association
(IOGA), a group of small independent producers in the State of West Virginia, argued that
"[s]ection 101o(b)(5) does not authorize the Commission to determine that gas which does qualify for a deregulated category does not also qualify for a regulated category." Oral Comments
of the Independent Oil and Gas Association in Docket No. RM84-14-000, Deregulation and
Other Pricing Changes on January 1, 1985, Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, at 2 [hereinafter IOGA Comments]. IOGA contended that such a construction is directly opposite to the
plain language of the statute. Id.
137. See generally Comments of Barrett Energy Company et al. in Docket No. RM84-14000, Deregulation and Other Pricing Changes on January 1, 1985, Under the Natural Gas
Policy Act, at 2 ("[Ihe Commission's proposed rule will have an adverse effect on Barrett's
operations and those of other similarly situated small independent producers who develop
NGPA section 107(c)(5) gas reserves in tight sands formations."). Producers contended that
without the higher incentive price, exploration and development of hard-to-produce gas under
§§ 107(c)(5) and 108 would no longer be profitable and thus, would be abandoned. See Damson Oil Comments, supra note 136, at 2. Producers argued that this result would not only
lead to severe economic hardship in the producing community, but also would deprive the
nation of substantial natural gas reserves. See id. at 3-4.
138. Order No. 406, supra note 23.
139. Id. at 46,875. Order No. 406 expressly provided that:
First sales of natural gas that is deregulated natural gas ... is price deregulated and
not subject to the maximum lawful prices of the NGPA, regardless of whether the
gas also meets the criteria for some other category of gas subject to a maximum
lawful price under Subtitle A of Title I of the NGPA.
18 C.F.R. § 270.208 (1988).
140. Order No. 406, supra note 23, at 46,878.
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congressional mandate to phase from regulated ceiling prices to market
clearing prices. 4 ' The pronouncement in section 121 that maximum lawful
prices for certain gas categories "shall... cease to apply effective January 1,
1985," 142 persuaded FERC to conclude that deregulation is statutorily required.' 43 This interpretation advanced by FERC supports the deregulation
of gas that qualifies under section 107(c)(5) or 108 and section 102 of the
NGPA. 14 FERC reasoned that the statutory intent to substitute market
forces for regulated prices supplants the statute's objective to increase natural gas supplies. 4'5 Armed with this understanding of the hierarchy of statutory goals of the NGPA, FERC's decision to prohibit producers from opting
out of deregulation comported fully with the statutory purpose of the
NGPA to phase from price regulation to market clearing prices.
FERC also examined the statutory statement on dual-qualification set
forth in section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA. While FERC characterized section
141. Id.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (1982).
143. Order No. 406, supra note 23, at 46,878. Interestingly, producers advocated the deregulation of dually qualified gas in an earlier FERC proceeding when market forces would
have produced higher prices for gas. See Interim Rule Covering High-Cost Natural Gas Produced from Tight Formations, 45 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (1980) [hereinafter Interim Rule on Tight
Formations]. FERC repeatedly referred to this alleged dramatic shift by producers from a
pro-deregulation to a pro-regulation stance. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals at 9 n. 13, FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 108 S. Ct.
1765 (1988) (No. 87-363) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari]; Brief for Respondent
FERC on Petition for Review at 27 n. 11, Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC, 813
F.2d 1059 (10th Cir.) (No. 84-2756), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988); Order No. 406, supra note
23, at 46,878 n. 10. The interim rule prescribed guidelines for the designation of high-cost natural gas and established the maximum lawful price necessary to encourage the production of
this gas. See Interim Rule on Tight Formations, supra. In their comments on the interim rule,
several producers advocated the deregulation of dual-qualifed gas whenever one of the price
categories under which the gas qualifies constituted a deregulated price, irrespective of which
price, the controlled or decontrolled, is higher. See Joint Comments of Indicated Producers in
High-Cost Natural Gas Produced from Tight Formations, Docket No. RM79-76-000, at 11-12
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Producers' Joint Comments]. Producers also asserted that "[i]t
is Section 121 which determines the removal of price controls not the provisions of Section
101(b)(5)." Id. at 12. Producers now argue, however, that FERC clearly missed the substance
of their previous arguments. See Producers' Brief in Opposition to Petitions for a Writ of
Certiorari at 15 n. 14, FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988)
(Nos. 87-263, 87-364) [hereinafter Producers' Brief in Opposition]. Producers assert, however,
that in the earlier proceeding, they advocated the deregulation of § 102 gas that also qualifies
as § 107(c)(5) tight formation gas as an option that FERC cannot deny. See id at 15 n. 14.
144. Order No. 406, supra note 23, at 46,878.
145. Id. FERC, however, did not ignore the NGPA's second objective to provide incentives to encourage natural gas exploration and development. Instead, to reconcile the two
competing goals, FERC determined "that the statutory intent to deregulate takes precedence
over the statute's increased supply objective." Id. But see Producers' Brief in Opposition,
supra note 143, at 13.
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101(b)(5) as "helpful, but not dispositive of the dual qualification issue,""
FERC nonetheless interpreted this section to require deregulation of dualqualified gas. 147 FERC determined that the "could result in the highest
price" language of section 101(b)(5) referred to the deregulated price because that price always could result in a higher price than a regulated ceiling
148
price.
In Order No. 406, FERC also responded to allegations that the deregulation of dual-category gas effectively deprived producers of the ability to collect the incentive price for natural gas qualifying under sections 107(c)(5)
and 108. FERC characterized producers claims of reliance on the incentive
price as "misplaced" 1 49 and "unsubstantiated." 1 50 FERC neither promised
nor suggested that dual-qualified gas would remain regulated and thus eligible for the incentive price.I" In fact, FERC had notified producers of the
possibility for deregulation of section 107(c)(5) gas in a previous interim
rule.1 2 FERC had not duped producers; instead, producers had duped
themselves by their unwillingness to consider the potential for deregulation
of dual-qualified gas.
Producers petitioned FERC to reconsider the treatment of dual-qualified
gas set forth in Order No. 406.153 Petitioners condemned Order No. 406 for
its failure to mirror legislative intent, its unlawful and arbitrary nature, and
its potential to lead to economic dislocation.1 54 On rehearing, in Order No.
406-A,' 5 the Commission denied the rehearing requests, thereby adhering
56
to its decision to deregulate dually qualified gas.1
146. Order No. 406, supra note 23, at 46,879.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also Interim Rule on Tight Formations, supra note 143. In the earlier proceeding, FERC solicited:
comments as to whether section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA requires the eventual deregulation of tight formation gas which also qualifies as section 103 gas the price for
which is deregulated in 1985 or 1987 .... Those that responded to this request
argued that section 101(b)(5) compels deregulation of tight formation gas when that
gas is finally determined to qualify under a deregulated category. The Commission

agrees and notes with regard to the change in the interim rule that this argument
applies equally to new tight formation gas which qualifies under section 102(c).
Id. at 13,422 (emphasis added).

153. Fourteen petitioners requested rehearing on the dual-qualified gas issue. See Order
Denying Rehearing on Deregulation and Other Pricing Changes on January 1, 1985, Under
the Natural Gas Policy Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,637, 50,637 (1984).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 50,638.
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C. Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC: A Federal Court of
Appeals Addresses the Dual-Qualified
Issue
In Martin Exploration Management Co. v. FERC,5' 7 natural gas producers, dissatisfied with FERC's treatment of the dual-qualification issue in
Order No. 406, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit to reverse FERC's decision to deregulate dual-qualified gas."' 8 The
Tenth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to consider the question of
natural gas simultaneously qualifying under a regulated and deregulated
price category of the NGPA.15 9 The challenge confronting the Tenth Circuit was not insignificant: to interpret the dual-qualification provision of the
NGPA without the assistance of judicial precedent."
The Tenth Circuit held that contrary to FERC's determination that the
NGPA mandated the deregulation of dual-qualified gas, the statute clearly
presented producers with a choice as to the price category, whether deregulated or regulated, under which to qualify particular gas.16 1 In reversing
FERC, the court of appeals characterized FERC's interpretation of the
157. 813 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988).
158. Id. at 1062.
159. See id. at 1067 n.8. However, a number of decisions have discussed § 101(b)(5) of the
NGPA in dicta. See generally Public Service Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S.
319, 335 (1983) (citation omitted) (stating that § 101(b)(5) "specifies that if a volume of gas fits
into more than one category, 'the provision which could result in the highest price shall be
applicable' "); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1985)
(The NGPA "provides that, where gas falls within the scope of multiple categories prescribing
different ceiling prices, the highest ceiling price is applicable."); Columbia Gas Dev. Corp. v.
FERC, 651 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that § 104 gas qualifying "for incentive
pricing under section 102(d), 107(c)(5), or 108, under the rule of section 101(b)(5) the highest
ceiling price becomes the applicable ceiling price"); Oklahoma v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636,
645 (W.D. Okla. 1980) ("Gas qualifying in more than one category is entitled to the highest
price."), aff'd, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
160. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1067 n.8. Despite the absence of judicial precedent
directly addressing the dual-qualification issue, the Tenth Circuit was not without guidance.
The standard of review used to evaluate FERC interpretations of the NGPA asked "whether
'Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress'." Id. at 1065 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). However, if Congress
fails to address directly the question at issue, or if the statute itself is ambiguous, the court then
"will defer when an agency has chosen between alternative possible constructions of an ambiguous statute." Id. The interpretation adopted by the agency "must be reasonable, but it need
not be the only reasonable interpretation or the interpretation that the reviewing court would
adopt ....

A reviewing court will defer to an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute

unless the agency interpretation is contrary to the policies Congress sought to implement in
enacting the statute." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see infra note 202 and accompanying text.
161. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1069.
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dual-qualification issue as contrary to the legislative history and the statutory language of the NGPA. 162 Interestingly, the court advanced this conclusion despite its admission that the drafters of the NGPA had neither
contemplated the possibility of regulated natural gas prices exceeding
deregulated prices,163 nor foreseen the anomalous result of natural gas pro16
ducers preferring the regulated ceiling price to the market clearing price.'
The Tenth Circuit commenced its review of Order No. 406 by considering
section 121 of the NGPA. The court posited that section 121 is ambiguous
because it failed to address explicitly the treatment of deregulated gas that
also qualifies for a regulated price.' 65 The Tenth Circuit, however, acknowledged that in the absence of another statutory provision, FERC's decision to
decontrol dual-category gas represented a reasonable construction of the ambiguous language of section 121.166 Despite this admission, the court did not
defer to the administrative interpretation of section 121. Instead, the court
concluded that Congress had anticipated the ambiguity of section 121 in
167
section 101(b)(5) of the NGPA.
Turning to section 101(b)(5), the Tenth Circuit stated that the plain language of this section addressed the question of dual-qualified gas.' 68 Section
101(b)(5) expressly includes those categories of natural gas covered by "any
maximum lawful price" 169 or by "any exemption from such a price." 170 The
court construed the words "exemption from such a price" to apply to those
categories of gas for which a ceiling price no longer exists, i.e., deregulated
gas.17' The Tenth Circuit observed that this interpretation of "exemption"
162. Id. at 1065.
163. Id. at 1071.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1066. For a review of § 121 of the NGPA, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
166. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1066.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 1067. The appellate court characterized FERC's exclusion of deregulated gas
from the scope of § 101(b)(5) as "based on a strained construction of the unambiguous language of § 101(b)(5) and a misunderstanding of the purposes Congress sought to achieve in
enacting the NGPA." Id.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(5) (1982).
170. Id.
171. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1067. Significantly, the Tenth Circuit did not reject
FERC's suggestion that the reference to "exemption from such a price" applied to statutory
provisions granting FERC the authority to establish special ceiling pricings. Id. The court
had "no doubt that the reference to 'exemption' in § 101(b)(5) can refer to those instances in
which FERC can exercise its statutory authority to set a different ceiling price when special
circumstances are present." Id. However, the Tenth Circuit objected to FERC's reasoning
that this interpretation of exemption would preclude reference to deregulated price categories,
Id. "It does not follow ... that 'exemption' does not refer to deregulated categories of gas as
well." Id.
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is consistent with the meaning of exemption in section 101(b)(9) of the
NGPA.17 2 Furthermore, in its review of section 101(b)(9), FERC itself con17 3
strued the word "exemption" of this section to refer to deregulated prices.
The court relied on the general rule of statutory construction that a word
74
used in two sections of a statute has the same meaning in each section.
After concluding that the "exemption" language of section 101(b)(5) refers to the deregulated price, the court reviewed the language of section
101(b)(5) providing that the category "which could result in the highest
price shall be applicable." 1 75 The Tenth Circuit focused on the precise scope
of the word "could" in section 101(b)(5). 176 While not contesting FERC's
supposition that deregulated natural gas prices theoretically could reach infinity, 177 the court observed that regulated gas prices also are capable of
reaching a similar indefinite rate. 17' The Tenth Circuit pointed to FERC's
statutory authority to raise prices for regulated gas 179 and the statutory
formula for gradual increases in ceiling prices180 to illustrate the proposition
that prices for regulated gas also could attain indefinite levels.181 The court
posited that an understanding of only the theoretical possibilities suggested
by the term "could," as advanced by FERC, would render section 101(b)(5)
172. Id. Section 101(b)(9) of the NGPA provides that:
In the case of(B) any price which is established under any contract for the first sale of natural
gas which is exempted under part B of this subchapter from the application of a
maximum lawful price under this subchapter,
such maximum lawful price, or such exemption from such a maximum lawful price, shall not
supersede or nullify the effectiveness of the price established under such contract.
15 U.S.C. § 331 l(b)(9) (1982) (emphasis added).
173. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1068. FERC propounded this interpretation of exemption in the Order No. 406 proceeding: "section 101(b)(9) sets forth the effect of the contract, regardless of the statutorily imposed maximum lawful ceiling prices or exemptions from
ceiling prices, i.e., deregulated prices." Order No. 406, supra note 23, at 46,879. Similarly, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted "exemption" in
§ 101(b)(9) to mean deregulated prices. See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 374 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("Section 101(b)(9) provides that the applicable maximum lawful price, or any applicable price deregulation, 'shall not supercede or nullify the effectiveness of the price established under' any contract."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
174. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1068.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(5) (1982).
176. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1068-69.
177. Id. at 1068.
178. Id. The court of appeals criticized FERC for failing to interpret "could" as broadly in
considering regulated gas as it had in considering deregulated gas. Id.
179. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314(b)(2), 3316(c), 3319(b)(2) (1982).
180. See id. § 3312(b)(2).
181. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1068.
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meaningless. 18 2 Reasoning that the "could result" language of section
101(b)(5) provided for the "comparison of the applicable price for each category at a particular moment,"' 8 3 the Tenth Circuit concluded that section
101(b)(5) requires that the category, whether regulated or deregulated, that
84
could produce the highest price shall apply. 1
To bolster its statutory interpretation of section 101(b)(5), the Tenth Circuit selected several congressional floor statements that implied a legislative
intent to allow a producer the option to elect the price category, whether
regulated or deregulated, under which to qualify particular gas. The court
singled out the explanations of section 101(b)(5) proferred by the foremost
congressional leaders on natural gas policy. The statements of Representative Dingell,' 8 and Senator Jackson, 18 6 evinced congressional willingness to
allow a producer the right to apply for the highest price, whether deregu87
lated or regulated, to which he is entitled.'
The Tenth Circuit, however, did not rely exclusively on either the express
language of the NGPA or its legislative history to uphold the reversal of
FERC's decision to deregulate dual-qualified gas. The court of appeals propounded that the statutory objectives of the NGPA also supported its treatment of the dual-qualification issue.' 8 The court opined that the statutory
aim of the NGPA to assure adequate natural gas supplies at reasonable
prices to consumers relied on both phased deregulation and incentive
prices."' The Tenth Circuit rejected FERC's argument that the deregulation objective of the NGPA takes precedence over the statute's second objective to provide incentives to increase natural gas supplies.' 9 ° Instead, the
two approaches to natural gas regulation embodied in the NGPA require
equal consideration. 9 By adopting this position, the court expressly disagreed with FERC's classification of incentive prices as an interim, and
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1069.
185. Id. at 1070; see also 124 CONG. REC. 38,364 (1978) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("It is
up to the producer to apply for whatever designation he determines is most likely to be of
greatest benefit to him (in most cases that will be the designation which also yields the highest
price).").
186. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1070; 124 CONG. REC. 29,109 (1978) (statement of
Sen. Jackson) (§ 101(b)(5) "stands for the proposition that a producer may claim or apply for
the highest price to which he is entitled").
187. Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1069.
188. Id. at 1070-71.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1071.
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therefore, a secondary goal of the NGPA.' 9 2 The Tenth Circuit charged
that FERC's characterization of the NGPA as a deregulation statute dis193
played a misunderstanding of the statute's other objectives.
The court also did not overlook the current market price for natural gas.
The Tenth Circuit candidly admitted that the drafters of the NGPA had not
anticipated a decline in natural gas prices.' 9 4 Consequently, Congress had
not foreseen the anomalous situation of producers preferring a regulated
price rather than a deregulated price for natural gas.' 9 However, despite
changes in the economic climate since the enactment of the NGPA, the
court concluded that market conditions do not license the judiciary to alter
express statutory terms.' 96
IV. FERC v. MARTIN EXPLORATION MANAGEMENT Co.: RESOLUTION
OF THE QUESTION OF DUAL-QUALIFIED NATURAL GAS

In FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 197 the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the appellate court, holding that the dual-qualification provision of the NGPA mandated the deregulation of natural gas simultaneously qualifying for a deregulated and regulated price.' 9 ' Writing for a
unanimous court, 99 Justice Brennan relied on the plain meaning of the statutory language200 and the NGPA's legislative objectives 20 1 to support the
decontrol of dual-qualified gas.2 °2
192. "We do not agree with FERC that the incentive prices are necessarily short-term."

Id.
193. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that "[d]eregulation is both phased and partial." Id.
By misinterpreting the NGPA to be exclusively a deregulation statute, FERC has
overlooked incentive prices and other provisions that sought to address the natural
gas shortage in a different way. We will not strain the plain meaning of § 101(b)(5)
in order to serve a goal of deregulation that is itself only one of several means
adopted to achieve the purposes of the NGPA.

Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197.

108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988).

198. Id.at 1768.
199. Justice White did not participate in the consideration of this decision.

200. Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1768 (quoting Bethesda Hospital Ass'n. v. Bowen,
108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988)).
201. Id. at 1769.
202. Id. at 1768-70. Interestingly, the Court did not base its decision to deregulate dualqualified gas on the principle of judicial deference to agency interpretation of a statute. Yet

this principle has particular importance in controversies involving the NGPA. In implementing this extraordinarily complex statute, the "Court generally accords 'great deference' to the

Commission in its interpretation of the NGPA." Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. FERC,
769 F.2d 1053, 1069 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 476 U.S.
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A. Deregulation of Dual-QualifiedGas: Is It Statutorily Prescribed?
The reasoning employed by Justice Brennan to support the deregulation
of dual-qualified gas is inconsistent with a careful reading of section
101(b)(5) of the NGPA. Justice Brennan concluded that section 101(b)(5) of
the NGPA governed ceiling prices exclusively.2 °3 However, the "exemption
from such a price" language of section 101(b)(5) also could refer to deregulated gas categories because it immediately follows "any maximum lawful
price" 2° and is separated by the conjunction "or" to suggest an opposite
1114 (1986) (citing Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. FERC, 721 F.2d 146, 147 (5th Cir.
1983)). The Supreme Court repeatedly affirms that the interpretation of a statute by those
responsible for its execution should be followed unless there are strong indications that it is
erroneous. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 382 (1981) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). The Court must only find that the agency's construction was
sufficiently reasonable to uphold the administrative finding. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) (citing Train v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)). Moreover, the administrative interpretation need not represent the sole reasonable one. Id. at 39.
See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-70 (1980) (affirming the administrative interpretation of statutory terms even though the appellate court, in reversing the
agency, had adopted a reasonable approach).
Despite the curious silence of the Court on the principle of judicial deference to agency
interpretation of a statute, the Court's reasoning bears an uncanny resemblance to the analysis
proferred by FERC. Compare Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1768, ("[w]hen one of the
provisions sets no price ceiling at all - ie., it deregulates - that provision governs" with
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 143, at 14 ("[w]here one provision sets a maximum
lawful price and another declares that there is no such ceiling, the latter provision governs");
compare Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1769, ("the Court of Appeals' reading... has the
effect of turning a statutory scheme of price ceilings and deregulation into a system of price
supports for producers"), with Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 143, at 17 ("[t]he
[appellate] court's decision establishes a uniform and permanent producer assistance program"); compare Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1769 ("nothing in the statute or legislative
history suggests that Congress wanted the classification of gas to turn on contractural terms"),
with Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 143, at 14 ("[c]ontrary to the court of appeals'
view, the statutory language contains no hint that it calls for comparison of producers'
contracts").
203. Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1768. Justice Brennan interpreted the language of
§ 101(b)(5) to require comparisons "between the highest price permitted by one provision and
the highest price permitted by another." Id. Thus, Justice Brennan read "provision" to include only regulated ceiling prices. Justice Brennan, however, did not disregard completely
statutory provisions that set no price ceilings. See id. He determined that deregulated price
provisions superseded price ceiling provisions. Id. "When one of the provisions sets no price
ceiling at all - Le., it deregulates - that provision governs." Id. This argument has merit.
However, upon the enactment of the NGPA, all price categories for natural gas arguably were
subject to ceiling provisions. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Indeed, the
NGPA gradually lifted ceiling prices over time. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Unless the drafters were truly forward-looking, the provisions that could result in the highest
price encompassed both regulated and deregulated gas categories.
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(5) (1982).
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meaning from the preceding language. 205 Moreover, interpreting "exemption" to be a clear reference to deregulated gas categories is consistent with
the use of the term in section 101(b)(9) of the NGPA.2 °' In fact, FERC
itself has construed "exemption" to mean deregulated price categories.2 °7
Additional language in section 101(b)(5) sustains the inclusion of both
regulated and deregulated prices within the scope of the statutory provision.
The "could result" language of section 101(b)(5) suggests reference to both
deregulated and regulated categories to determine the highest price applicable.20 8 Deregulated gas, unlike regulated gas, operates without the restriction of price ceilings, and, in truth, can reach higher indefinite levels. 2 9
Nevertheless, this feature does not preclude regulated gas from rising to similar high levels. 2 '° Furthermore, it is questionable whether Congress would
205. See IOGA Comments, supra note 136, at 4.
206. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
208. The Court elucidated that the alternate interpretation converted the word "could" in
§ 101(b)(5) to the word "will." 108 S. Ct. at 1769. In the Court's view, "'could' makes perfect sense if the statute does not mean to refer to particular contracts but rather to the generic
situation of parties in a precontract state." Id. The Supreme Court opined that Congress
realized that parties to a contract would prefer provisions allowing the highest possible prices.
Id. Higher prices result with market prices because ceiling prices only act as a direct restraint
if market prices exceed ceiling prices. Id. Yet, in fact, higher prices have not resulted with
market-clearing prices.
Producers developed a well-reasoned response to the theory that the word "could" in
§ 101(b)(5) contemplated exclusively deregulated prices:
This argument seeks to transform the meaning of "could" from "was, should be or
would be able" to the realm of theoretical possibilities. Since a deregulated price
could in theory be infinitely high, that option must always control, says the Commission. The Court of Appeals dealt effectively with the position, finding that reference
to the real world is necessary.... The Court of Appeals correctly found that the
"could" theory of the Commission would render meaningless a statutory provision
that deals with two possibilities by forever negating one of those possibilities.
Producers' Brief in Opposition, supra note 143, at 10.
209. See supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Producers' Brief in Opposition,
supra note 143, at 9.
210. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text. The opinion did not deny that regulated gas prices also could exceed deregulated gas prices. Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at
1768-69. Instead, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation because it would "require[ ] a
determination of which provision would actually result in a higher price under current market
prices for that gas and the contractual arrangement each producer had for the sale of that
gas." Id. at 1769. Clearly, the Court was reluctant to adopt a reading of § 101(b)(5) that
would require reference to "[lthe provision that actually result[ed] in the highest price at any
particular moment." Id.
Justice Brennan raised the concern that dual-price treatment for dual-qualified gas will lead
to disuniformity in natural gas markets. See id. at 1769-70. Justice Brennan's apprehension is
not unfounded. He correctly concluded that by deregulating dual-category gas, a more orderly
application of NGPA pricing provisions would result. Id. at 1769. "[O]ne would normally
expect that a regulatory regime would apply uniformly rather than varying in such a chaotic
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have drafted section 101(b)(5) unless both pricing provisions, deregulated
and regulated, applied.2 11 This approach only would vitiate section
101(b)(5) by forever excluding reference to one of the two price possibilities.212 To achieve this result, Congress simply could have limited the application of section 101(b)(5) to multiple regulated categories and to restrict its
operation to pre-deregulation situations.2 13
B.

Effectuation of Legislative Objectives

Interestingly, the legislative history of the NGPA did not pervade the
Martin Exploration opinion. In fact, the Supreme Court interpreted section
101(b)(5) without truly confronting the legislative history of either the provision or the statute itself. Regardless of whether the Court's disregard of the
legislative history was deliberate or inadvertent, congressional floor statefashion." Id. If the alternative approach prevailed, natural gas prices would vary not only
from seller to seller "and from contract to contract, but from day to day as the actual market
price of that gas changes." Id.; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America at 4, FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765
(1988) (Nos. 87-363, 87-364) [hereinafter INGAA Brief in Support] ("dually qualified.., gas
shall forever be in a state of price instability, with the price alternately flip-flopping between a
regulated and a deregulated status, depending on which category will ...produce the highest
actual price"). But see Producers' Brief in Opposition, supra note 143, at 14 ("the argument
that the Court of Appeals' result could cause frequent switches from regulated to deregulated
category treatment is both factually erroneous and beside the point").
Producers vehemently attacked the charge that dual-price treatment would cause switches
from regulated to deregulated prices:
Producers committed large investments to drill, fracture and equip wells producing
high cost tight formation gas and to maintain or enhance production from stripper
wells in reliance on continued availability of the NGPA price incentives in these
categories. Producers have been unable to negotiate new contracts in the market at
the NGPA incentive category price ceilings since early to mid-1983. The relatively
few producers able to benefit from regulated treatment through older contracts with
ceiling price clauses covering still-regulated incentive category gas will not be making
frequent switches between deregulated and regulated treatment in the current and
foreseeable energy markets.
Producers' Brief in Opposition, supra note 143, at 14.
The appellate court, however, summarily dismissed the potential for price switching by observing that the effectuation of congressional intent often produces anomalies. Martin Exploration Management,Inc. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 1059, 1072 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1765
(1988) (quoting Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 374 (1986)); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the appellate court adopted a hands-off approach to the problems resulting from dual-qualified price
treatment, delegating to Congress the responsibility to fashion cures to unwise legislation.
Martin Exploration, 813 F.2d at 1072.
211. See Producers' Brief in Opposition, supra note 143, at 10-12.
212. Id. at 12.
213. Id.
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ments are riddled with inconsistencies concerning the precise operation of
the NGPA and its provisions.
Contradictory interpretations of the appropriate price treatment for dualqualified gas persist in congressional statements. While individual legislators
do not speak for the entire Congress, their remarks highlight the confusion
and uncertainty regarding the operation of the dual-qualification provision.
To illustrate, statements by Representative Dingell can be singled out either
to corroborate 2 14 or to contravene the decision to deregulate dual-qualified
gas.215 Similarly, Senator Bartlett advocated the deregulation of dual-qualified gas, particularly natural gas qualifying under section 108 of the
NGPA.21 6 However, additional remarks by Senator Bartlett suggest a reversal of this position: "This bill will keep under Federal controls forever2 1the
7
following categories of natural gas: ... and stripper well natural gas.",
The indecision over the operation of the dual-qualification provision reflected Congress' larger uncertainty over the precise purpose of the NGPA.
In the NGPA, Congress attempted to correct the market distortions resulting from the regulation of natural gas prices under the NGA.21 s Congress
concluded that the NGA pricing formula fostered imbalance in the supply of
and demand for natural gas.2 9 Recognition that continuation of administrative determination of prices would perpetuate disorder in natural gas markets prompted Congress to introduce a plan of deregulation.2 2 ° Congress,
however, hesitated to legislate immediate decontrol of all natural gas prices
and, in turn, fashioned a phased deregulation scheme in order to increase
gradually the role of market forces in setting natural gas prices. 22' Furthermore, to protect consumers from inordinate increases in natural gas prices,
Congress maintained price controls on several gas categories.22 2 Both the
production-incentive and price-control provisions of the NGPA manifest the
congressional commitment to encourage natural gas production at reason214. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

215. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
216. Senator Bartlett stated that stripper wells are deregulated "only to the extent that
such wells are otherwise new wells and would be deregulated anyway." 124 CONG. REC.
31,387 (1978); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
217. 124 CONG. REC. 29,379 (1978). Senator Bartlett also advised that "[t]heir character
as stripper wells, as shown under section 121, does not get them deregulated in any way." 124
CONG. REC. 31,387 (1978); see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 88, 94-95 and accompanying text.

221. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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able prices to consumers. 22 3
Significantly, the Supreme Court looked to the legislative objectives of the
NGPA to support its decision to decontrol dual-qualified gas.2 24 The Court
charged that dual-price treatment for dually qualified gas would "turn[ ] a
statutory scheme of price ceilings and deregulation into a system of price
supports for producers., 225 Indeed, the Court correctly observed that Congress did not intend to create a producer assistance program with the passage of the NGPA 2 26 However, contrary to the Court's claim, Congress did
not dismiss the importance of price assistance for producers in the NGPA.
The production-incentive provisions of the NGPA attest to the congressional awareness for the necessity of price assistance to induce natural gas
production.22 7 Moreover, the Court's observation that Congress did not
suggest "that producers should receive higher prices than deregulation
would afford them" 228 overlooked one crucial fact. Congress expected natural gas prices to rise, not to fall, with deregulation.22 9 Congress viewed deregulation as "the most favorable regime for producers, 2 0 because of its
belief, albeit mistaken, that market prices would exceed regulated prices.
V.

CONCLUSION

FERC v. Martin Exploration Management Co. resolved the debate over
223. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Producers addressed the legislative goals of
the NGPA.
[T]he NGPA was compromise legislation embodying a mix of conflicting objectives.
While a less regulated field market was an important eventual objective, so was the
immediate equalization of access to field markets by both interstate and intrastate
purchasers. Supply elicitation was another primary and continuing objective of the
NGPA. Continued incentive pricing for Section 107(c)(5) high-cost gas and Section
108 stripper gas was plainly another of Congress' supply eliciting objectives.
Producers' Brief in Opposition, supra note 143, at 13. Producers correctly observed that supply elicitation represented an integral element of the NGPA.
224. Courts often recognize that statutory interpretation must review not only the language
employed, but also its logic. See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v.
FPC, 391 F.2d 470, 474 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 857 (1968). "For statutes, as the
Supreme Court has said, are 'instruments of government,' not 'exercises in literary composition.' " 391 F.2d at 474 (quoting United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 260 (1959)). Furthermore, the Court sanctions "[d]eparture[s] from a literal reading of statutory language ... to
effect the legislative purpose," Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1966), and allows the
judiciary to "look through the statute itself to what lay behind it," Salt River Project, 391 F.2d
at 474 (footnote omitted).
225. FERC v. Martin Exploration Management, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (1988).
226. Id.
227. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
228. Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1769.
229. See supra notes 27, 194 and accompanying text.
230. Martin Exploration, 108 S. Ct. at 1769.
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the dual-qualification issue by deregulating natural gas simultaneously qualifying under a regulated and deregulated price category of the NGPA. The
decision of the Supreme Court effectively will lower the price for dually
qualified natural gas.
Current market conditions, however, obviate any significant price effect
resulting from the deregulation of dual-qualified natural gas. 231 Natural gas
prices have plummeted since the passage of the NGPA. Without the higher
prices necessary to support drilling programs, producers have severely curtailed exploration and development of hard-to-produce natural gas reserves.
Absent the addition of new supplies of sections 107 and 108 natural gas, the
volumes of natural gas subject to dual-qualification will remain minimal.
Alternatively, if natural gas prices escalate in the future, the deregulation
of dual-qualified natural gas could regain significance. With higher market
prices, it is unlikely that pipelines and consumers will continue to herald the
deregulation of dually qualified gas. Faced with public outcry over rising
gas costs, FERC quickly may regret its decision to decontrol dual-qualified
gas. Despite a return of high natural gas prices, Congress likely will not
revisit the dual qualification issue because of the inherent controversy and
divisiveness that accompanies federal legislative attempts to regulate natural
gas prices.232 However, regardless of the actual response of FERC or Con231. The parties contest the price magnitude of the deregulation of dual-qualified gas. 'See
INGAA Brief in Support, supra note 210, at 2-3 n.3 (maintaining that absent deregulation of
dual-qualified gas, total gas costs would have increased by $300 million). But see Producers'
Brief in Opposition, supra note 143, at 17 (characterizing the financial impact of dual-price
treatment of dual-qualified gas as "minimal").
232. Congress, however, may not rely on the pricing provisions of the NGPA to address
the potentially deleterious impact on natural gas production of the Supreme Court's decision
in Martin Exploration. To illustrate, Senator Domenici recently introduced legislation to reinstate the Tight Sands Tax Credit for this hard-to-produce natural gas. S. 2859, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S14,515-16 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988).
Unconventional fuels, including tight sands gas, qualify for a tax credit provided that crude
oil prices drop to a certain level and the gas price remains regulated. See 26 U.S.C. § 29 (Supp.
IV 1986); see also Credit for Producing Fuel from a Nonconventional Source, Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. (CCH) 492 (1987). The requisite "price level [for crude oil] was reached in 1984, and a
tax credit of 52 cents per million cubic feet of gas was provided." 134 CONG. REC. S14,516
(daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988) (statement of Sen. Domenici). The availability of the tax credit was at
the discretion of the producer. "If a producer chose a regulated [natural gas] category, it was
entitled to the Tight Sands Credit. If it chose deregulated, the Tax Code did not provide a
credit." Id.
Martin Exploration, however, eliminated the tax credit for tight sands gas by deregulating
this dual-qualified gas. While "[t]he credit was not an issue before the Supreme Court .... as
a result of this ruling, the credit has been unavailable since January 1, 1985." Id. The deregulation of dual-qualified gas, coupled with the abolition of the Tight Sands Tax Credit, has
harmed natural gas producers. See id. As explained by Senator Domenici, "[t]he worst case
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gress, changed conditions in natural gas markets could resurrect the natural
gas industry's unrest with the dual-qualification issue.
Donna M. Fettuccia

scenario has happened: The price drop has occurred and the tax credit was abolished by the
FERC order." Id.
Despite the fact that Congress adjourned without considering Senator Domenici's initiative,
see Gas Daily, Oct. 21, 1988, at 2, col. 3 ("The bill.., is expected to be brought up again in the
next session of Congress."), the legislation indicates congressional recognition that the deregulation of dual-qualified gas poses serious problems for the continued production of hard-toproduce natural gas. 134 CONG. REc. S14,516 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Domenici). Absent a regulated status for hard-to-produce natural gas, producers require the
credit to maintain operations. Id. (stating that "the most influential factor in deciding to continue production .. .has been the Tight Sands Credit"). If Senator Domenici's bill is any
indication, the dual-qualified gas issue may reappear in the next congressional session.

